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DISCUSSION KICK-OFF
Selecting Europe’s Judges: 





What is judicial legitimacy?
The concept of legitimacy is a favorite debate among many political 
philosophers and lawyers. Since our perceptions of what is legitimate 
change over time, we look at legitimacy not as a static concept but as 
one evolving over time.
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Judicial appointments, particularly to constitutional, federal 
and international courts have always been a sensitive matter. 
In Europe, the impartiality and professional merit of both 
domestic and supranational judges are becoming a bedrock 
principle of judicial legitimacy. However, although it is hard 
to imagine today, the first judges at the European Court of 
Justice’s (ECJ) predecessor court were not professional 
lawyers and instead came from diverse professional 
backgrounds such as a high school teacher or an economist. 
Similarly, judicial independence did not always rank high on 
the legitimacy scale of courts. What now seems unthinkable 
used to be the norm: in medieval England, judges were an 
integral part of the king’s administration, so the distinction 
between judicial and administrative duties was rather 
obscure. And certainly, whether on the bench of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg or 
elsewhere, the fact that judges were invariably old white 
men did not call judicial legitimacy into question.
However, times have changed. Today, two main arguments 
for having diversity on the bench are starting to be 
advanced. The first argument is that the diverse, real-life 
personal experiences of the judges will provide balanced 
perspectives to judicial decisions and substantively affect 
the law. The second argument is that even if the personal 
experiences of the judges does not—or, as some would 
argue, should not—affect the law in a substantive way, the 
presence of underrepresented groups on the bench conveys 
a sense of inclusiveness and procedural fairness, which 
encourages more members from such groups to enter the 
legal profession and to make use of the judicial system.
The New Vetting Panels in Luxembourg and Strasbourg 
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More recently, calls for improving the expertise of judges 
and limiting the unfettered discretion of national executives 
in the appointment process have resulted in the institution 
of expert judicial panels that vet the national nominations at 
both the ECJ and the ECtHR. The Lisbon reform of the EU 
Treaty established the so-called Article 255 Panel. 
Operational since 2010, the Panel is composed of seven 
members from former national highest court judges and 
constitutional judges, as well as former ECJ judges. The 
European Parliament nominates one of the Panel members, 
whereas the President of the Luxembourg Court suggests all 
the others; all Panel members are appointed by the 
European Council for a term of four years, renewable once. 
The Panel 255 has the task, after interviewing the candidates 
and deliberating in private, to deliver either a favorable or an 
unfavorable reasoned opinion on the suitability of both first 
time candidates and candidates suggested for 
reappointment by the Member States. So far, seven national 
candidates for judges at the General Court of the European 
Union (formerly, the First Instance Court) have received 
negative opinions and were later replaced by their 
governments. It remains to be seen whether in the future 
the Panel will also vet nominations for the ECJ.
The ECtHR’s judicial reform that resulted in the 
establishment of an Advisory Panel in Strasbourg used as a 
blueprint and adapted both the institutional design of the 
Article 255 Panel and the criteria that this Panel later 
elaborated. According to the procedure set forth in the 
European Convention of Human Rights, each Contracting 
Party submits a shortlist of three candidates. After the Sub-
Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe interviews the candidates, it recommends a 
candidate to the Assembly’s plenary committee; the 
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Assembly is then empowered to elect the new judge by a 
majority vote. In light of pressure from the Parliamentary 
Assembly, NGOs (such as Interrights), and former members 
of the ECtHR, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe established an Advisory Panel that consists of seven 
members composed of former Strasbourg judges and various 
international and national highest court judges. The 
Strasbourg Advisory Panel has to examine the curricula vitae
of the candidates. After deliberating in private, it advises the 
national governments on the suitability of their nominees 
before the lists are officially submitted for consideration.
From Ad-Hoc to Formalized Domestic Procedures 
Although the national procedures for nominating either ECJ 
or ECtHR judges remain a prerogative of the Member States, 
the two judicial panels seem to have de facto contributed to 
the formalization of various national nomination procedures. 
After the supranational reforms, judicial panels that emulate 
the structure of the two supranational ones were established 
as a step of the nomination procedure for selecting either 
ECJ and/or ECtHR judges in a number of European states 
(Finland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Belgium and Croatia). 
At the moment of writing, Spain and Greece remain in the 
minority of EU states that still have exclusively executive-
dominated models of selecting European judges. This type of 
selection procedure is dwindling, however: even countries 
that do not use independent bodies to evaluate nominations 
of judges to the European courts have introduced reforms. 
Since 2013, the Italian Parliament must be apprised of the 
nominating procedure followed by the government; after 
assuming office, a judge from the ECJ or the General Court 
might be summoned by the parliamentary committee to 
attend a parliamentary hearing.
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Hammering Out Legitimacy: Transparency, Accountability 
and Gender Balance 
Evidently, far from being a paper tiger, the Article 255 Panel 
has had an impact on a number of national nominations and 
has also unofficially influenced the selection processes in 
some Member States, thus limiting executive arbitrariness. It 
remains to be seen whether the Member States will extend 
the mandate of the Panelists for four more years, whether 
the Panel will have an even larger role to play in selecting 
judges for the General Court in accordance with proposals 
to increase the number of judges at that court, and whether 
the Panelists will have the audacity to also veto candidates 
for the ECJ.
However, although the Panel 255 has had some positive 
effects on the selection of judges, it has also been criticized. 
Like its Strasbourg counterpart, the 255 Panel lacks 
democratic accountability and transparency, and has made 
use of its wide discretion in setting selection criteria. For 
instance, the Panel 255 requires that candidates for the 
General Court possess between 12 and 15 years of 
experience in exercising high-level duties and 20 years of 
experience for the ECJ. What would “high-level duties” 
imply? A more relaxed interpretation would mean that the 
successful ECJ candidate would have served at a lower court 
for a couple of years after having been appointed as a judge 
at the national supreme or constitutional court, or that the 
candidate’s twenty years of experience begin accruing when 
he is an assistant professor. Alternatively, a more stringent 
interpretation would mean that the average candidate for 
the ECJ would have served as a judge on the bench of a 
national supreme or constitutional court and/or taught as a 
full professor for twenty years. The latter interpretation 
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would effectively mean that judges would be 60 or even 70 
years old at the time of their nomination. Incomparison, the 
current ECJ Vice-President Lenaerts was 35 years old when 
he joined the General Court and 49 when he joined the ECJ.
Along with the criterion of merit, gender balance on the 
judicial bench is gradually gaining ground as an important 
principle of judicial legitimacy. Following calls from the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and a 2008 
Advisory Opinion of the ECtHR, the national governments 
are now compelled to present at least one female candidate 
in their lists containing three candidate judges for the 
Strasbourg court. Since exceptional circumstances can 
waive this requirement, it is seen as a ‘soft’ rather than a 
‘hard’ quota. The gender balance of the other EU institutions 
is regarded as part of EU institutional legitimacy, something 
that the European Parliament emphasized in 2013 on first 
reading of the Corporate Board Gender Quotas Directive
that aims for 40% female representation among non-
executive board directors by 2020. Parliament reasoned 
that: “The Union institutions, bodies and agencies and the 
European Central Bank should lead by example as regards 
gender equality in decision-making, inter alia by setting 
objectives for a gender-balanced representation at all 
levels.” Gender, however, is currently not among the criteria 
for selection of Luxembourg judges.
Marijn van der Sluis has posted a response to this post.
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Gender Equality make it to Luxembourg?” is forthcoming in M. Bobek 
(ed.), “Selecting Europe’s Judges”, Oxford University Press, 2015. 
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